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Revised draft
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS
IN OECD NATIONS* 
 
Abstract
In analyzing the performance of market economies, it is useful to include measurements of
the extent of government regulation. Constructing such indices, however, raises some difficult
methodological issues. After reviewing some of these problems, we compare the results of three
recent quantitative studies of regulation in OECD nations, one based on an extensive review and
quantification of laws and regulations, the other two based on opinion data of those familiar with
these regulations. Despite their very different methodologies and coverage of particular types of
governmental regulation, the results of the three studies are significantly correlated which suggests
that all three capture an important underlying reality.
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SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
IN OECD NATIONS* 
Acting on the belief that governmental regulation has a significant impact on economic
performance, this brief essay explores the aggregate extent of such regulations in various OECD
nations. Any such measurement, however, runs into the immediate difficulty  that “extent” has
several different meanings. Nevertheless, by examining three recent attempts to quantify regulations,
many of  these problems are clarified so that a more rounded picture can be gained. We leave both
the analysis of the actual effect of regulation (the basic data on regulation cover a period too recent
for performance data to be available) and the reasons why the extent of regulation varies among
counties to others.
Two different types of indicators can be employed in measuring the extent of regulation:
“Objective measures” are based on the details of governmental regulation in various areas, which
are assembled, quantified, and condensed. Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000) (hereafter O-
NSB) adopt this approach for the OECD nations. “Subjective measures” are based on surveys of
business people and experts, who express their views on the extent of government regulation in
various areas. Kaaufman, Kraay, and Zoldo-Lobatón (1999-a; 1999-b, 2000) (hereafter S-KKZ) and
Pryor (2002-b) (hereafter S-P) adopt this approach for the OECD nations. These three studies are
the empirical focus of our investigation.
Because of measurement difficulties, it is first necessary to explore a number of methodo-
logical issues, both broad and detailed. Then we present the three specific indices and, by comparing
and contrasting them, show that it is possible to derive a relatively unambiguous measure which
allows a perspective on the extent of government regulation in various OECD nations.
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A. Methodological Issues
1. Broad Advantages and Disadvantages of Objective and Subjective Measures
The desirable and undesirable aspects of the objective and subjective measures can be quick-
ly summarized.
The most obvious advantage of the objective measures is that they do not greatly rely on the
personal judgements of people unduly influenced by ideology, ignorance, a narrow focus on local
or national regulation, or other distorting elements, such as business cycle conditions. We would
expect, therefore, that this measure would be exogenous to economic developments occurring at the
time the data are collected, a desirable feature if they are to be used in empirical analyses of the
economic impact of regulation. Moreover, the data can be deemed to be “exact” to the extent that
they are free of noise other than (hopefully small) measurement errors.  1
The disadvantages of the objective measures, however, deserve note: (i) On an aggregative
level they are extremely expensive to make, since they require assembling a huge data base and
assistance from a great number of governments and lawyers to clarify particular points of law. Only
international organizations have the funds and the clout to obtain such data and carry out such a
task.  2
(ii) Such measures can, perforce, only focus on regulation on the national level. In federal countries,
however, considerable regulation of economic activity is carried out by local governments and, since
these are not included in the indices, they are incomplete. The may also be incomplete because
particular laws and regulations are not investigated. (iii) Such measures can not indicate how the
regulations are enforced and the extent to which enforcement is influenced by particular aspects of
the legal system, such as the conflicts of law between different levels of government, the range and
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efficiency of regulatory enforcement, and special features such as the “adversarial legalism” found
in the U.S. (Kagen 2000).  (iv) The quantification of the regulations requires the construction and3
combination of various types of indexes reflecting various aspects of the laws. At this point
subjective elements can enter. 
The most obvious advantage of subjective measures is that the data base can be more easily
assembled, since a variety of international surveys on business and expert perceptions of the extent
of government regulation have been carried out in recent years. Furthermore, the answers reflect the
manner in which the regulations are enforced, since restrictive regulations that are enforced simply
and unambiguously may prove less of a burden than less restrictive regulations where the regulated
companies are subject to lawsuits from all directions and at all levels of the judicial system.
Furthermore, such survey data can cover regulation at all levels of government, depending on the
ways in which the questions are asked.
The obvious disadvantage, of course, is that they rely on personal judgements which, as
noted above, may be flawed and influenced by factors that are unrelated to the actual regulatory
environment such as the respondents ideology or the current state of business conditions. As a result,
the comparability of answers between nations is problematic, especially since many surveys ask
questions about particular countries only to residents of that country.  The variability due to4
unrelated factors and measurement error is likely to be larger than in objective measures, and
cross-country comparisons of subjective measures should therefore account for sampling error
unless very large samples of informed respondents are used.
2. Two Specifics Problems: Coverage and Data Bases
a. Coverage: To determine the extent to which these estimates yield the same or
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different results about the extent of government regulation, it is important to distinguish three ways
of viewing the government’s role in the productive sphere.
One viewpoint of government influence focuses on the type of regulation. Legal-framework
regulations act through civil and criminal law to define and limit property rights such as zoning
restrictions; to specify contractual obligations; to set quality standards for goods and services
through tort law; and to establish conditions defining fraud, discrimination, and improper or
incompetent behavior by market participants. Industry-specific regulations apply only to particular
industries and act to set prices (e.g., for electricity) or maximum profit rates; to determine eligibility
for entering a market (e.g., production or occupational licenses); to use a particular resource (e.g.,
public lands or frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum); to provide special subsidies or taxes
for particular industries; and to define  prudent practices for specific types of businesses such as
banks and other financial intermediaries. Administrative regulations define the ways in which
business firms interact with the government. These include reporting requirements, general licensing
regulations applying to all busineses, and similar activities; and general entry and exit procedures.
Finally, general economic regulations deal with the specific economic activities of the economy as
a whole and act to restrict pollution; to set rules for industrial relations (e.g. hiring and firing
restrictions); to promulgate health and safety standards for workplaces; to limit the content of
advertising; to establish antitrust policies; to determine fair business practices; and to formulate the
rules for economic transactions with the rest of the world (tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and the
like). All three studies under review focus primarily on administrative and general economic
regulation. Nevertheless, O-NSB and S-KKZ also take into account some industry-specific regula-
tions including barriers to foreign ownership, while these aspects are not covered in any detail in
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S-P. Moreover, both S-KKZ and S-P include certain legal framework issues pertaining to the actual
enforcement of regulations.  5
A second viewpoint is the extent to which the direct and indirect governmental influences
on business activity are taken into account. O-NSB and S-KKZ explicitly take into account direct
government intervention into business sector activities, such as public control of business enter-
prises, while S-P focuses exclusively on regulations that have a more indirect influence. In addition
to federal regulation, two other types of indirect governmental influences on economic activity need
to be considered - the methods by which regulations are enforced (including the importance of
expensive lawsuits in the process), and the various regulatory measures of governments below the
federal level. As noted above, both are most likely to be taken into account in the subjective
measures based on the responses of business executives (S-P), less likely to be included in the
evaluations of experts (which are contained in S-KKZ) and are not reflected at all in the objective
measures.
A third viewpoint is the completeness of the coverage of the regulations taken into account
in the calculations. For instance, both O-NSB and S-P include certain labor regulations, while
S-KKZ does not. S-P also covers financial and environmental regulations, which the other two
studies do not.
b. Data bases: All three of the studies discussed below focus on the 1997 - 98 period.
They differ considerably in the sources of data and the way in which the data are handled. 
In the last few years the OECD has assembled the requisite data base for calculating
meaningful objective measures of a country’s regulatory regime and it has published the results in
a series of papers.  The data-base underlying their results include  around 1000 observations of6
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particular aspects of central government regulations in product and labor markets in each OECD
country. Of these, around 300 observations concern economy-wide regulations and the rest are
industry-specific.  Only a subset of the information contained in the database (amounting to 1507
observations) was actually used in constructing the various indicators, reflecting the focus on
economy-wide regulations directly affecting product market competition. Industry-specific informa-
tion was used in computing economy-wide regulatory indicators either when it consistently spanned
a large number of industries or  it concerned industries that account for a large share of GDP (e.g.
retail distribution) or it was representative of the overall regulatory stance.
O-NSB quantify the impact of various individual legal provisions into a series of indices and,
using subjective weights, calculate 17 indicators for particular types of product market regulations
and 18 indicators for labor market regulations related to individual hiring and dismissals. These
indicators are grouped into five regulatory domains: state control, barriers to entrepreneurship,
barriers to trade and investment and restrictions on permanent and temporary labor contracts.  The8
indicators included in the state control and barriers to entrepreneurship domains are also divided into
two broad alternative areas: administrative regulations and economic regulations.
The World Bank has also sponsored a study of objective measures of regulations in 85
countries, but these results, which cover 85 countries, just pertain to the entry of new firms.
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). Since our essay focuses on the entire
regulatory regime, rather than a single set of regulations, we do not further discuss this extremely
useful World Bank study.  9
Another World Bank team (S-KKZ) combines questions from 13 different surveys, both of
business people and of experts to measure the aggregate extent of regulation. They group these
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observations into four broad areas: rule of law, regulatory burden, government effectiveness and
corruption, from which they derives summary indicators for each. Here, we will focus on the
regulatory burden indicator, which has an obvious overlap with the O-NSB and S-P measures. This
indicator includes data from 61 questions (many of which were very similar to each other) on
various aspects of general economic regulations including such areas as trade and finance. In
contrast to S-P and O-NSB, it includes few questions on environmental or labor regulations.
S-P combines questions from two surveys of business people and includes 33 questions
which were deliberately selected to cover the foreign sector, labor markets, product markets (broadly
defined, since regulations referring only to specific industries are omitted), financial markets, and
the environment.
 3. Aggregation Methods and Other Gritty Statistical Details
The three studies use different methods to combine the subindices into an overall index of
government regulation. In cases where subjective weights are used, they come from the authors of
the various studies. S-P uses subjective weights throughout, while both O-NSB and S-KKZ use a
mix of subjective weights and statistical techniques (described below). O-NSB use these techniques
mainly as a tool for reducing the dimensionality of the data, S-KKZ uses them to derive probabilistic
assessments on the reliability of the cross-country comparisons.
In particular, O-NSB uses subjective weights at the lowest level of aggregation to derive
their basic indicators. Thereafter, they employ a principal components analysis to derive weights for
combining the various indicators into summary measures of regulation in each domain.  Then, the10
summary indicators are combined into indicators of product and labor market regulation using the
same statistical technique. That is, O-NSB considers the basic information on regulatory provisions
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as essentially non-stochastic and uses principal components analysis merely as a device to classify
and summarize the data.
S-KKZ gives a weight to each question which is derived from the results of latent variable
regressions. This study considers the replies to business surveys as random variables affected by
residual “specific” variability (both within and across countries) that cannot be fully accounted for
by the common factors, and estimates both the summary measures and their confidence intervals. 11
S-P gives equal weight to each indicator to derive six broad areas of regulation. He then
combines these in a single index, generally giving equal weight to each (excepting financial market
and environmental regulations).
Aside from the statistical properties of the resulting summary indicators, both principal and
unobserved components methodologies weigh each of the subindices according to the degree to
which they help explain the joint variance of all the subindices among the nations in the sample.
This implies that two different regulations, one of which creates a heavy burden on industry, the
other which is relatively unimportant, may be given roughly the same weight if they are included
in the same factor. It should be noted, however, that the O-NSB summary measures (for overall
product and labor market regulations and for the five regulatory domains) remain essentially
unchanged if aggregation is made by simple average of the subindices included in each of the
regulatory domains.  The subjective approach to the weighting of the subindices in S-P contains12
an arbitrary element and the confidence intervals of the resulting summary indicators are unknown.
4. Final Methodological Observations
From this description, several conclusions are immediately evident: All three aggregative
measures under investigation employ quite different methodologies and data in their construction;
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all three reflect different aspects of the aggregate extent of government regulation; and all three are
incomplete. If government regulation in the various countries is driven by unique economic
problems in the nation, then it is highly unlikely that the three indices are correlated. This means that
at the present time it is not possible to arrive at a relatively unambiguous ranking of the extent of
government regulation in various OECD nations. If, by way of contrast, ideological elements play
an important role in the enacting of regulations, then we would expect a relatively high correlation
between these three indices and, as a result, a relatively unambiguous ranking of nations. 
B. Empirical Comparisons
In order to gain perspective, it is useful to begin by comparing regulations in specific areas.
Thus, we start with the product market, for which all three studies provide data. Then we turn to
labor market, and finally we look at the summary measures combining both measures.
1. Product Market 
Table 1 about here.
In Table 1 we present the aggregative indices for the product. In this and the other tables, the
results of the three studies are standardized so that for each study, the rating of the country with the
least regulation is set at zero, the rating for the country with the most regulation is set at one, and
the other scores are adjusted using a linear transformation to fit between these extremes to derive
a cardinal scale. We also rank the countries to provide an ordinal scale.
The comparison of the measures of product market regulation yields statistically significant
correlations (at the .05 level) between all three indicators. These bivariate correlations also persist
when we control for other factors.  Such results support the notion that ideology played a key role13
in the enacting of regulation, rather than the pragmatic solution of problems arising from various
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types of market failures..
Some useful information is gained by examining those nations where the three estimates
differ the most, using as a criterion whether the ordinal rankings differ by more than six. Comparing
S-P and O-NSB studies, the former shows much greater regulation in the U.S. and Australia, and
much less regulation in Finland and Switzerland. Part of these differences can be explained by the
different emphasis on public ownership, which is largely ignored in the S-P measures and contrib-
utes to explain the low degree of regulation of the U.S. and the high degree of regulation of Finland
in the O-NSB indicator. The relatively high regulation in the U.S. shown in the S-P index also
reflects the climate of adversarial legalism in that nation, which, as noted in Section A, can only be
picked up in the subjective indicators.
Comparing S-KKZ and O-NSB, the former rates Japan and Sweden as much more  regula-
tion; and Finland and Norway, as much less. These differences are difficult to explain; although they
may rest, in part, on the degree of informal control that is not reflected in actual laws, especially
regarding Japan where the tradition of informal “ministerial guidance” is strong. The four major
differences between the rankings of S-KKZ and S-P (Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, relatively
more regulation shown in S-KKZ; U.S., relatively more regulation shown in S-P) also raise unsolved
puzzles and may rest, in part, on the fact that S-KKZ included ratings of “experts” and they might
not have taken the costs of adversarial legalism into account in assessing the restrictiveness of
regulations, while S-P included only business executives who must daily face such costs.
In contrast to the labor market regulations, the correlations between the overall ratings of the
degree of governmental regulation in the product market do not seem to hold true when one looks
at the indices of regulation in more specific areas. The data in Appendix Table 1 show that the
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ratings and correlations between two of these from the O-NSB and S-P studies. For both foreign
trade and administrative regulations, the correlations between the indices are much lower than for
summary indicators and are not significant at conventional levels. This is hardly surprising since it
is precisely in these areas where it is most difficult to measure the regulatory burden - the direct and
indirect cots of administrative compliance or the existence of informal barriers to trade and capital
flows, and in which the gap between formal regulation and enforcement can be largest. The O-NSB
measure of administrative regulation is also considerably more detailed than the S-P measure.  
2. Labor Markets
Only S-P and O-NSB provide separate data on labor market regulation. S-P includes seven
different questions in four different areas: the perceived impact of minimum wage legislation on
hiring labor, the flexibility of hiring and firing practices, the flexibility of the labor market (includ-
ing adjustment of working hours in cases of change in product demand) and incentives to work
(including trade-offs between social protection and work incentives). O-NSB focuses only on hiring
and firing practices, but at a much greater level of detail than S-P. In particular, this former study
includes the procedural inconveniences of dismissal (including delays to start notice of dismissal,
definition of unfair dismissal, and difficulties of dismissal for employees with 20 years of tenure),
direct costs of dismissals (including severance pay), and notice and trial period before dismissal. For
temporary employment O-NSB also looks at procedures (including types of work for which
temporary contracts are legal and the maximum number of successive contracts) and maximum
duration of contract (including maximum cumulative duration). While the measures of O-NSB and
S-P of hiring and firing practices are somewhat different, the coverage is much closer than in the
case of regulation of foreign trade discussed above.
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Table 2 about here
The comparisons of labor market regulation in Table 2 show higher correlations than the
comparisons of product market regulation. All of the bivariate correlations are significant at the .05
level. Of greatest importance, the correlation coefficient between the S-P and the O-NSB measures
of regulation of hiring and firing is .76, which is particularly high. We also tested whether the
correlation between these measures of labor market regulation would hold if other variables were
added to the equation. Similar to our experiments with the measures of product market, the relation-
ship between the two ratings of hiring and firing practices continues to hold when we try to control
for some of the factors unrelated to labor market regulation that may account for spurious
cross-country variability in the S-P indicator.  14
Looking at the ranking of nations and isolating those in which the rank differs by more than
six in the two studies, we see that S-P finds much greater regulation of hiring and firing practices
in Belgium and much less regulation in Denmark, Japan,  and Portugal. These differences might be
partly due to differences in coverage arising from the fact that the O-NSB study posed quite specific
questions, while the S-P index focused on hiring and firing regulations in general and the answers
may have been influenced by other types of labor market regulation (given the high correlation
between hiring and firing regulations and overall labor market regulations). For instance, Belgium
has relatively high minimum wage and unemployment benefits, compared to the rest of the OECD,
while Japan has much lower; and these may influence the subjective ratings of hiring and firing
regulations in general. Other differences may arise from differences in enforcement.  For these15
labor market regulations, the legal climate in the U.S. does not seem to have made as much
difference as in the product market.
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3. Overall Ratings
As noted above, while all three measures deal with product market regulations, only S-P and
O-NSB cover the labor markets, and only S-P covers other areas, such as finance or environment.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare the rankings of these overall measures because they may
summarize in different ways the policy approaches followed by OECD countries.
Table 3 about here
Panel B in Table 3 shows that the bivariate correlations between the broad measures of
regulation are very strong and statistically significant, being highest for the O-NSB and S-P
combined measures of product and labor market regulation. Both the objective and subjective
measures seem to reflect the same reality. Surprisingly, all of the correlation coefficients (excepting
the S-P: P+L and S-P: Total) are roughly the same - the two subjective rankings are not much more
closely related than they are with objective ranking. 
The comparisons of the largest differences in the ranking reveal that the two subjective
measures do not deviate systematically from the objective measure in the same way. Turning first
to the labor and product markets, the S-P: P+L and O-NSB: P+L rankings are quite similar and differ
by more than six ranks only for Belgium and the United States, both of which show much greater
regulation in the S-P estimates. The latter undoubtedly reflects the adversarial legalism that is found
in the United States. S-KKZ shows much greater regulation than O-NSB: P+L for Belgium, Canada,
and Japan; and much less regulation for Netherlands and Portugal. Undoubtedly differences in
coverage of the two indices account for some of these divergencies. Finally, when looking at the two
subjective ratings, S-KZZ shows much greater regulation in Canada, Japan, and Switzerland and
much less regulation in Norway than the S-P:P+L estimates. Again, part of these differences appear
14
to be explained by differences in coverage. Interestingly, Japan and Switzerland appear to be
particularly difficult countries to evaluate, since their rankings differ considerably across not only
objective and subjective measures but also across the latter. For Japan, part of the problem may lie
in the differences between formal regulation and informal powers exercised by various parts of the
government over economic activity; for Switzerland, differences in taking account of regulation by
governments below the federal level may play a role.
C. Several Brief Conclusions
This study looks at three quite different measures of the extent of regulation. O-NSB draws
upon the largest data base of regulations; S-P, the smallest (but many of the questions used in the
surveys from which the results are drawn cover several related regulations). Coverage is also
different, with S-P including the broadest number of areas; although the exact coverage of S-KKZ
is difficult to summarize, it does not include the labor market while O-NSB and S-P do. The
aggregation approaches are also different.
Despite these differences, overall perceptions of government regulations by business leaders
and experts and the objective assessment of formal regulations appear to be relatively well aligned
in the areas of labor and product markets. In brief, despite the very different approaches, the results
are quite similar, which suggests that ideological differences, rather than unique problems of market
failures that face the individual nations, account for differences in the extent of regulation in various
OECD nations. 
To provide a clearer picture of these cross-country differences in regulation ithat are
identified by the joint consideration of the three overall measures of regulation (S-KKZ, O-
NSB:P+L and S-P: Total), we employed a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s methodology
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to group countries according to the similarity of objective and subjective assessments.  Two large16
groups of countries emerge quite clearly: a relatively “liberal” group including all English-speaking
countries, as well as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland; and a relatively
“regulated” group including most other continental European countries and Japan. Using a less
restrictive distance criterion we  further isolated a group of “ultra-liberal” countries (the US, the UK,
New Zealand and Ireland) and a group of “ultra-regulated” countries (France, Italy and Greece).
These results provide a rigorous confirmation of our a priori expectations. 
In brief, our conclusion is that all three studies point to the same economic reality, even
though they draw upon quite different data and handle the data using very different statistical
techniques, in detail. The next step for research is to determine more exactly how these differences
in regulation influence economic performance.
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Table 1: Product Market Regulations in Some OECD Nations: Objective and Subjective Measures
Panel A: Scores and Ranks
Total product market                                                            
O-NSB               S-KKZ                S-P                    
Scores Ranks Scores Ranks ScoresRanks
Australia 0.24   3 0.30   8 0.40 12
Austria 0.49   8 0.37 10 0.39 11
Belgium 0.80 17 0.50 17 0.74 18
Canada 0.54 11 0.41 14 0.24   6
Denmark 0.50   9 0.19   7 0.38 10
Finland 0.67 14 0.08   5 0.00   1
France 0.88 18 0.60 18 0.78 19
Germany 0.52 10 0.39 11 0.31   7
Greece 0.97 20 0.74 19 1.00 21
Ireland 0.20   2 0.06   3 0.32   8
Italy 1.00 21 0.75 20 0.87 20
Japan 0.58 12 1.00 21 0.61 15
Netherlands 0.49   7 0.08   4 0.15   4
New Zealand 0.43   5 0.00   2 0.13   3
Norway 0.97 19 0.34   9 0.60 14
Portugal 0.70 15 0.39 12 0.65 17
Spain 0.64 13 0.42 15 0.58 13
Sweden 0.49   6 0.43 16 0.37   9
Switzerland 0.76 16 0.40 13 0.01   2
United Kingdom 0.00   1 0.00   1 0.16   5
United States 0.28   4 0.09   6 0.62 16
Panel B: Correlation coefficients (R)
O-NSB S-KKZ S-P
O-NSB 1.00   .64*   .55*
S-KZZ 1.00    .67*
S-P 1.00
Note: For S-P, the scores for product market, foreign trade sector, and general economic-
administrative regulations are combined, with each given an equal weight. For S-KKZ, the overall
regulation score is presented, since no labor market indicators are included. For the regressions, an
asterisk designates statistical significance at the .05 level.
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Table 2: Labor Market Regulations in Some OECD Nations: Objective and Subjective Measures
Panel A: Scores and Ranks
Total labor marketJust hiring and firing regulations          
S-P                  S-P                    O-NSB             
Scores Ranks   Scores Ranks Scores Ranks
Australia 0.63 13 0.55   9 0.24   6
Austria 0.68 16 0.75 16 0.61 12
Belgium 0.91 19 0.81 17 0.53   9
Canada 0.28   6 0.28   6 0.12   3
Denmark 0.39   8 0.00   1 0.36   8
Finland 0.61 12 0.58 10 0.53 10
France 1.00 21 0.94 18 0.81 17
Germany 0.92 20 0.98 20 0.72 15
Greece 0.56 10 0.74 15 0.94 20
Ireland 0.36   7 0.46   8 0.22   4
Italy 0.86 17 1.00 21 0.87 19
Japan 0.25   5 0.43   7 0.69 14
Netherlands 0.68 15 0.61 11 0.61 11
New Zealand 0.12   3 0.17   4 0.23   5
Norway 0.65 14 0.72 14 0.76 16
Portugal 0.51   9 0.70 13 1.00 21
Spain 0.56 11 0.69 12 0.85 18
Sweden 0.90 18 0.96 19 0.63 13
Switzerland 0.00   1 0.01   2 0.30   7
United Kingdom 0.12   4 0.14   3 0.08   2
United States 0.11   2 0.19   5 0.00   1
Panel B: Correlation coefficients (R)
S-P overall S-P: hiring and firing O-NSB: hiring and firing
S-P: overall 1.00   .91*   .64*
S-P: hiring and firing 1.00   .76*
O-NSB: hiring and firing 1.00
Note: For the correlation coefficients, an asterisk designates statistical significance at the .05
level.
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Table 3: Overall Business Regulations in Some OECD Nations: Objective and Subjective Measures
Panel A: Scores and Ranks
Product market Product and labor markets     All major areas
S-KKZ             O-NSB           S-P                S-P                 
Scores Ranks Scores Ranks Scores Ranks Scores Ranks
Australia 0.30   8 0.24   6 0.57 11 0.60 11
Austria 0.37 10 0.61 12 0.60 12 0.61 12
Belgium 0.50 17 0.53   9 0.93 19 0.98 20
Canada 0.41 14 0.12   3 0.29   4 0.33   5
Denmark 0.19   7 0.36   8 0.44   7 0.45   7
Finland 0.08   5 0.53 10 0.31   5 0.27   4
France 0.60 18 0.81 17 1.00 21 1.00 21
Germany 0.39 11 0.72 15 0.66 14 0.70 15
Greece 0.74 19 0.94 20 0.91 18 0.97 19
Ireland 0.06   3 0.22   4 0.38   6 0.36   6
Italy 0.75 20 0.87 19 0.98 20 0.97 18
Japan 1.00 21 0.69 14 0.50 10 0.48   9
Netherlands 0.08   4 0.61 11 0.44   9 0.46   8
New Zealand 0.00   2 0.23   5 0.14   2 0.16   2
Norway 0.34   9 0.76 16 0.71 17 0.73 17
Portugal 0.39 12 1.00 21 0.67 15 0.63 13
Spain 0.42 15 0.85 18 0.65 13 0.66 14
Sweden 0.43 16 0.63 13 0.69 16 0.72 16
Switzerland 0.40 13 0.30   7 0.00   1 0.00   1
United Kingdom 0.00   1 0.08   2 0.15   3 0.23   3
United States 0.09   6 0.00   1 0.44   8 0.51 10
Panel B: Correlation coefficients (R)
S-KKZ O-NSB:P +L S-P:P+L S-P:Total
S-KKK 1.00 0.62* 0.61* 0.59*
O-NSB: P+L 1.00 0.72* 0.68*
S-P: P+L 1.00 0.99*
S-P: Total 1.00
Note: P+L = product and labor markets. The S-P calculations for all areas include, in
addition to labor and product (foreign trade, general economic/administrative, and direct product
markets), financial markets, and environmental regulation. For both the S-P and O-NSB indices for
product and labor markets, the separate indices are combined according to the weighting methods
employed in each study. In panel B, the asterisks designate statistical significance at the .05 level.
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Appendix Table 1: Two Subindices of Product Market Regulations in Some OECD Nations:
Objective and Subjective Measures
Panel A: Scores and Ranks
Only foreign trade                             Only general administrative regulations
O-NSB            S-P                  O-NSB           S-P                     
Scores Ranks Scores Ranks Scores Ranks Scores Ranks
Australia 0.00   2 0.57 13 0.24   3 0.52   9
Austria 0.06   5 0.20   3 0.44 11 0.68 16
Belgium 0.12   9 0.66 16 0.96 20 0.81 18
Canada 1.00 20 0.53 12 0.15   2 0.45   7
Denmark 0.06   6 0.13   2 0.25   4 0.67 15
Finland 0.12 10 0.49 11 0.65 14 0.00   1
France 0.35 16 0.86 18 1.00 21 1.00 21
Germany 0.06   7 0.26   4 0.83 17 0.58 12
Greece 0.52 19 0.64 14 0.56 12 0.99 20
Ireland 0.00   2 0.33   9 0.37   7 0.37   6
Italy 0.03   4 0.66 15 0.96 19 0.93 19
Japan 0.35 15 1.00 21 0.84 18 0.61 13
Netherlands 0.06   8 0.00   1 0.38   9 0.32   4
New Zealand 0.30 14 0.27   5 0.38   8 0.33   5
Norway 1.00 21 0.69 17 0.37   6 0.64 14
Portugal 0.37 17 0.37 10 0.40 10 0.76 17
Spain 0.15 11 0.89 20 0.67 15 0.54 10
Sweden 0.24 12 0.27   6 0.58 13 0.56 11
Switzerland 0.52 18 0.28   7 0.81 16 0.19   2
United Kingdom 0.00  2 0.30   8 0.00   1 0.22   3
United States 0.26 13 0.89 19 0.29   5 0.49   8
B. Correlations (R)
O-NSB S-P O-NSB S-P
O-NSB 1.00     .28 1.00   .40
S-P 1.00 1.00
Note: For S-P, the index is labeled “general economic regulations,” but the coverage is
roughly the same as the “administrative regulations” of the O-NSB index. An asterisk designates
statistical significance at the .05 level.
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1. Such errors can occur, for instance, if there are differences in the interpretation of
questions by government officials responding to a questionnaire; or if the regulations of particular
nations have different degrees of specificity; or if, for political reasons, the responses by
governmental authorities are deliberately distorted.
2. The problem is not so great if one country is being studied over time. Moreover, certain 
shortcuts, such as measuring the number of pages of regulations or the governmental costs of the
regulating bureaus can be used. These measures are briefly summarized in Pryor (2002-a: Chapter
11). 
3. For instance, Kagen found in his interview data that although regulations may be less in
the U.S. than in other countries, U.S. employers are often much more cautious about taking such
particular actions because of the possibility of expensive law suits. He also found that legal costs
arising from such law suits and with negotiating with regulators at various levels of government
seem higher in the U.S. than in other nations. As a result, we would expect the subjective indicators
of regulation in the U.S. to be much higher than the objective indicators. 
4. If the subjective estimates also require the respondent to rank the relative restrictiveness
of various regulations, then such results may not reflect absolute differences and, thus, cannot be
compared across nations. Neither of the subjective indices discussed below contained such
questions.
5. The OECD International Regulation Database and the papers in OECD (2001) provide 
details on specific regulations in several service industries.
6. Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000) and OECD (2001). The OECD International 
Regulation Database and its documentation can be accessed through  the OECD Website at
http://www.oecd.org/. Recent data on labor market regulations can be found in OECD (1999-a,
1999-b).
7. The database also contains observations on market and industry structure.
Industry-specific data have been used in a series of supplementary studies of several utilities and
service industries (OECD 2001; Nicoletti, 2000), but these will not be considered in this essay.
8. State control includes the following detailed indicators: scope of public enterprise sector,
size of public enterprise sector, special voting rights, control of public enterprises by legislative
bodies, use of command and control regulations (especially for particular industries, and price
controls (also for particular industries). Barriers to entrepreneurship include: licenses and permits
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system, communication and simplification of rules and procedures, administrative burden for
corporations, administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms, sector specific administrative burdens,
legal barriers to entry in a wide range of industries, and antitrust exemptions for state-controlled
enterprises. Barriers to trade and investment include ownership barriers, discriminatory procedures,
regulatory barriers, and tariffs.
9. Djankov et al. present data for five measures: the number of regulatory steps, the number
of work days required to register a new firm, the costs of registering a firm as a percent of the per
capita GDP, the time and cost of registering a new firm as a percent of the per capita GDP, and the
absolute dollar value of time and cost of registering a new firm. In 14 out of 15 cases, these five
measures are significantly correlated (0.05 level of significance) to the three objective and subjective
measures of regulation for the entire economy discussed in this essay. 
10. The sub-domains identified by principal components analysis are: public ownership,
government involvement in business operation, regulatory and administrative opacity, administrative
burdens on startups, barriers to competition, explicit barriers to international trade and investment
and other barriers to trade.
11. On the distinction between principal and unobserved components analyses see Everitt
and Dunn (1991). It should be noted that objective measures too could be considered to be random
across countries to the extent that countries are drawn from a larger population of national regulatory
outcomes. 
12. Of course results change substantially for the indicators corresponding to the
sub-domains identified by principal components analysis.
13. We tried several different types of statistical experiments. In one set of regressions, we
tried to account for subjective biases by taking into account the state of the business cycle in the
various countries (the gap between potential and actual output), particular biases in the English
speaking world (a dummy variable of 1 if the nation is English speaking), and the subjective labor
market assessments. Letting Prod-S-P stand for product market evaluations of the S-P sample; Prod-
O-NSB for the product market evaluations in the O-NSB sample, Lab-S-P for the labor market
evaluations in the S-P sample, OG for output gap, and ES for English speaking, we calculated the
following regression (standard errors are below the coefficients, an asterisk designates statistical
significance at the .05 level):
Prod-S-P = 0.027 + 0.853* Prod-O-NSB + 0.265 Lab-S-P + 0.066* OG + 0.098 ES   R  = 0.60832
     (0.132)  (0.204)          (0.173)            (0.032)           (0.124)      n = 21
We also calculated a series of regressions holding per capita income, the logarithm of the
population and ratio of foreign trade to the GDP constant, but these also continued to show a
statistically significant relationship between the assessments of the extent of regulation in the three
studies.
24
14. Let S-P:H-F stand for the S-P index for regulation of hiring and firing; O-NSB:H-F, for
O-NSB variable for regulation of hiring and firing; Prod-S-O for the S-O rating of product market
regulation; OG, for output gap; and ES for English speaking. Following the same procedures as
those outlined in the previous footnote, we derived the following relationships:
S-P:H-F = 0.075 + 0.782* O-NSB:H+F + 0.127 Prod-S-O - 0.002 OG + 0.044 ES    R  = .58742
                (0.178) (0.330)       (0.240)                 (0.035)        (0.187)     n = 21 
We also calculated a series of regressions holding per capita income, the logarithm of the
population and ratio of foreign trade to the GDP constant, but these also continued to show a
statistically significant relationship between the assessments of the extent of regulation in hiring and
firing.
15. Neither of the two studies includes a measure of the tightness in granting employment
permits to foreign workers. If these were included, Switzerland would reveal a higher degree of
labor market regulation.
16. For details on this clustering methodology, see Everitt (1993: 55- 90). The full results
are available from the authors upon request.
